Pakistan's Civil Society Still Needs U.S. Support

Jamsheed K. Choksy

As part of the recently signed Kerry-Lugar Bill authorizing $7.5 billion in economic assistance for Pakistan over the next five years, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. State Department will be expected to "assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government" in Pakistan, as outlined in the draft metrics for evaluating progress in Pakistan presented by the Obama administration to Congress in September. The goal is to enhance Pakistan's local capacity for sustainable communal and economic growth so that counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts can be successful. Rebuilding civil society will be even more important as a bulwark against militancy once the Pakistani military's current offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan ends.

Yet, simultaneously, a major reorientation in U.S. policy toward Pakistan is underway, with the planning, administration, and staffing of reconstruction projects being handed over to the government of Pakistan and to private Pakistani organizations. U.S. officials hope this will both reduce Pakistanis' negative reactions to foreign aid, and safeguard American civilians by removing them from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

There is no doubt that both social reconstruction and enhanced security is desperately needed in the FATA and NWFP, where local populations still face intimidation from armed Islamic terrorists. Economic opportunities have declined, leaving approximately 60 percent of the FATA's 5 million inhabitants and 20 percent of the NWFP's 17.5 million residents below the poverty level. Literacy has fallen to 17.4 percent in the FATA and 49 percent in the NWFP, because militants have destroyed secular schools.

What remains uncertain is whether local Pakistani organizations have the expertise and capacity to implement development efficiently, especially after the current fighting ends.

Indeed, Pakistani and foreign aid workers as well as officials of the FATA and NWFP are concerned by the possibility of unregulated and poorly directed funding. They are convinced that on-site U.S. guidance is necessary in addition to financial assistance. A senior USAID economist stated that lack of American involvement would "seriously compromise" reconstruction efforts. It seems that the U.S. is tossing Pakistan's government a proverbial bone -- control over billions of dollars of aid-related funds in exchange for advancing American counterinsurgency priorities in the country.

Is the trade-off worthwhile?

The increasing absence of USAID personnel and subcontractors is bemoaned by Pashtuns as a "terrible success" for the Taliban and al-Qaida, for it gives the impression that the militants have run the Americans out of town. So despite the security risks, the U.S. needs to demonstrate to skeptical Pakistanis that bilateral partnerships are based upon engagement at the local level, rather than upon directions from afar. As important, U.S. agencies must utilize official Pakistani security resources plus locally provided residential and administrative areas, rather than creating neocolonial expatriate enclaves.

But contrary to those who tout only the dangers, USAID and its subcontractors have demonstrated some success at ensuring that civil society development projects benefit both Pakistan and the U.S.

Over 100,000 micro-enterprises (.pdf) were established in the NWFP by USAID to ensure economic independence from militants. Skilled and unskilled workers in the NWFP and FATA who receive civil society-related employment have commented that they do not object to salaries being paid through U.S.-funded projects. Rather, they value being able to "feed, clothe, and shelter" their families "without shedding blood."

As importantly, where missteps have occurred, American aid workers with on-site experience have worked with Pakistani officials to correct them. So, for example, the U.S. currently does not brand aid to the FATA and NWFP, in the belief that this protects staff and beneficiaries from terrorist retaliation. However, since many local residents surmise correctly that the aid delivered by the government of Pakistan originates with USAID, the attempt to limit visibility has contributed to baseless suspicion of American attempts to colonize Pakistan. Local Pakistani and American representatives are working to correct this, realizing that far from fanning suspicion, transparency will mitigate the rumor-fueled resistance to foreign assistance that has been building within Pakistan recently.

Another error is the routine refusal by U.S. administrations to requests for educational development by Pakistani Muslim clerics, for fear of assets falling into Taliban and al-Qaida hands. Local officials and American contractors realize that Washington's fears are misguided and misplaced. Their field experience indicates that extending clearly labeled aid to carefully chosen madrasas would highlight how American resources are utilized in partnership with the Pakistani government and Muslim institutions, in ways that not only are not anti-Muslim but that benefit mainstream Islam and Pakistan.

Most important, because the government and people of Pakistan are finally accepting the challenges of counteracting militancy, it is vital that the U.S. administration respect local sovereignty. The slightest involvement of American troops and security contractors from private organizations would undercut Pakistanis' fierce sense of nationalism, and so facilitate the spread of anti-American sentiments by Islamic militants.

If the Pakistani government and peace-seeking citizens are slowly winning the battle for the hearts and minds of FATA and NWFP's residents, it is through the reconstruction of civil society and not through warfare alone. And U.S. assistance for incorporating the FATA and NWFP back into Pakistani civil society has been the key to the recent successes.

Sustaining positive outcomes, however, requires cautious policy, tactful engagement, and constant consultation -- not just between senior officials but also with those actually working in the NWFP and FATA. Militaries can win battles, but only society can ensure stability. Given the aid allocation over the next five years, an American withdrawal from direct engagement in Pakistan's societal development will squander a unique opportunity to get things right.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Indian, Iranian, Islamic, and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. He has conducted research in Pakistan since 1984. The views expressed are his own.