Iftikhar Momin
South Waziristan, given a combination of forbidding terrain and entrenched presence of the hardcore elements of TTP and al-Qaeda fighters, is a tough military nut to crack. The situation has been building up for a considerable time and as the Pakistan Army moves ahead to eliminate and flush out some of the most feared al-Qaeda fighters along with their TTP henchmen and destroy their infrastructure, the enormity of the challenge is not lost on any one. It is the largest ever anti-terrorist operation that has been mounted on either side of the Pak-Afghan border, in which 30,000 Pakistani troops have been committed. Its outcome is bound to have a deep impact on the war against terror not only in the region but also on security of metropolises around the globe.
The objective of the operation is to break the stranglehold of al-Qaeda, who in close collaboration with TTP, is holding the Mehsud tribesmen to ransom in their own land. It is a measure of the desperate situation that centuries' old traditional hierarchy of tribal authority lies wasted and warlords, in most cases Taliban upstarts, now call the shots and hold sway in the badlands of Waziristan. Such vacuum of authority has thrown up a string of maverick Taliban commanders aligned with al-Qaeda, including Nek Muhammad, Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud and now Hakeemullah Mehsud, who have turned the South Waziristan area into the heart of darkness feeding destructive instability into entire Fata region and beyond.
Terrorists of all hue, involved in acts of terrorism, have sought refuge here. The trails of all major acts of terrorism in and outside Pakistan inevitably lead to this fountainhead of terrorism. Battle hardened foreign fighters; Arabs, Chechen particularly Uzbeks, have thrived here under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. The threat level has made an operation inevitable and costs are estimated to be high.
Even as the operation moves forward in face of tough and determined resistance, some elements in foreign media have raised the issue of Pak Army's 'understanding' with tribal chiefs Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar; Taliban commanders in Northern Waziristan, who have agreed not to interfere with operations in Southern Waziristan. This certainly is a pragmatic political move, which not only provides a greater freedom of movement to the Pak Army against TTP and al-Qaeda but also reduces opposition to the conduct of operations in South Waziristan. Taliban movement has many factions and it is important that the campaign against TTP and al-Qaeda in South Waziristan remains proscribed to the intended scope.
It is important for Pakistan to ensure that Taliban resistance in Afghanistan should not combines with TPP and al-Qaeda to join the fight in South Waziristan. Such a contingency may suit other players in the game but this scenario needs to be avoided by Pakistan at all cost. The 'understanding' serves to emphasize the ideological divide in the Taliban movement and should be seriously considered by US and NATO forces that tend to treat the resistance in Afghanistan as monolithic and are routinely tempted to bite more than what can be chewed.
It is good that US for the present have accepted the aims and objectives of Rah-i-Nijat in an understanding spirit. "We have a shared goal here and the shared goal is fighting violent extremism," State Department spokesman said at a briefing.
It is however the Indian response that, coming at a time when Pak Army is seized with the campaign in South Waziristan, should prove instructive in understanding the Pakistani threat perception vis-à-vis India. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while making a veiled reference to Pakistan, during his address the top commanders of the three services, said that the situation in India's immediate neighborhood had worsened and expressed deep concern over intelligence reports of "imminent terror attacks" in the country.
To many Pakistani observers what he meant to communicate was that any terrorist incident occurring on Indian soil may see a repetition of the 2001 -2002 confrontation that followed the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 Dec 2001. Why should he raise the possibility of a terrorist strike in India and by implication hold Pakistan responsible for it should be of interest to US military leadership which tends to scoff at the Pakistani assertions that even in the current state of affairs the major threat to Pakistan's security emanated from India.
The veiled threat may be attributed to the Indian anxiety caused by dismantling of al-Qaeda/TPP terror network in which it has invested heavily. India has not lacked in motivation to build up the menace of TPP in a relentless proxy war. It is also worried that a defeat of her protégés will make its position in Afghanistan difficult to sustain.
For Pakistan severing of the umbilical cord that links TPP with the Indian bases in Afghanistan should remain a top priority. Sealing of border with Afghanistan thus emerges as an imperative of the campaign in which US and NATO forces should play an active part.
Operation Rah-i-Nijat has taken a good start and is well onto its way to success. It should, God willing, come to a completion within the six to eight weeks period before the onset of a freezing winter which will limit the conduct of large scale operations. Its focus must remain on isolating the al-Qaeda, TPP and a clutch of other terror outfits from the local population of Mehsuds, followed by annihilation in detail. While holding onto the cleared land will remain important, to prevent a comeback by terrorists, initiation of political and developmental initiatives to utilize the window of opportunity provided by Operation Rah-i-Nijat is paramount so that the militants' hold over Fata can be effectively broken. A humane and well-organized care of the IDPs should prove a good starting point in launching a campaign for the hearts and minds of the local populace, which remains the ultimate objective of the campaign in South Waziristan.
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